Social diversity favors the emergence of cooperative behavior

Throughout their life, humans often engage in public goods games in situations ranging from family related issues to global warming. In all cases, the tragedy of the commons threatens the possibility of reaching the optimal solution associated with global cooperation. Up to now, individuals have been treated as equivalent in all respects, in sharp contrast with real life situations, where diversity abounds. Here we discuss the results reported in [Santos et al. Nature (2008) 454:213-6], where we show how social diversity provides an escape from this paradox. We investigate the impact of social diversity in the evolution of cooperation in complex networks of interaction. We show that the diversity in the number and size of the collective endeavors each individual participates and with the individual contribution to each investment promotes cooperation. The enhancement of cooperation is particularly strong when both wealth and social ties follow a power-law distribution, providing clues on the self-organization of social communities.SCOPUS: cp.pinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishe

Personalized Predictive ASR for Latency Reduction in Voice Assistants

Streaming Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) in voice assistants can utilize prefetching to partially hide the latency of response generation. Prefetching involves passing a preliminary ASR hypothesis to downstream systems in order to prefetch and cache a response. If the final ASR hypothesis after endpoint detection matches the preliminary one, the cached response can be delivered to the user, thus saving latency. In this paper, we extend this idea by introducing predictive automatic speech recognition, where we predict the full utterance from a partially observed utterance, and prefetch the response based on the predicted utterance. We introduce two personalization approaches and investigate the tradeoff between potential latency gains from successful predictions and the cost increase from failed predictions. We evaluate our methods on an internal voice assistant dataset as well as the public SLURP dataset.Comment: Accepted for Interspeech 202

Self-organization of punishment in structured populations

Cooperation is crucial for the remarkable evolutionary success of the human species. Not surprisingly, some individuals are willing to bare additional costs in order to punish defectors. Current models assume that, once set, the fine and cost of punishment do not change over time. Here we show that relaxing this assumption by allowing players to adapt their sanctioning efforts in dependence on the success of cooperation can explain both, the spontaneous emergence of punishment, as well as its ability to deter defectors and those unwilling to punish them with globally negligible investments. By means of phase diagrams and the analysis of emerging spatial patterns, we demonstrate that adaptive punishment promotes public cooperation either through the invigoration of spatial reciprocity, the prevention of the emergence of cyclic dominance, or through the provision of competitive advantages to those that sanction antisocial behavior. Presented results indicate that the process of self-organization significantly elevates the effectiveness of punishment, and they reveal new mechanisms by means of which this fascinating and widespread social behavior could have evolved.Comment: 13 pages, 4 figures; accepted for publication in New Journal of Physic

The evolution of prompt reaction to adverse ties

SCOPUS: ar.jinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishe

Cancer phenotype as the outcome of an evolutionary game between normal and malignant cells

There is variability in the cancer phenotype across individuals: two patients with the same tumour may experience different disease life histories, resulting from genetic variation within the tumour and from the interaction between tumour and host. Until now, phenotypic variability has precluded a clear-cut identification of the fundamental characteristics of a given tumour type.Journal ArticleResearch Support, Non-U.S. Gov'tSCOPUS: ar.jinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishe

Evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewarding

Our wellbeing depends as much on our personal success, as it does on the success of our society. The realization of this fact makes cooperation a very much needed trait. Experiments have shown that rewards can elevate our readiness to cooperate, but since giving a reward inevitably entails paying a cost for it, the emergence and stability of such behavior remain elusive. Here we show that allowing for the act of rewarding to self-organize in dependence on the success of cooperation creates several evolutionary advantages that instill new ways through which collaborative efforts are promoted. Ranging from indirect territorial battle to the spontaneous emergence and destruction of coexistence, phase diagrams and the underlying spatial patterns reveal fascinatingly reach social dynamics that explains why this costly behavior has evolved and persevered. Comparisons with adaptive punishment, however, uncover an Achilles heel of adaptive rewarding that is due to over-aggression, which in turn hinders optimal utilization of network reciprocity. This may explain why, despite of its success, rewarding is not as firmly weaved into our societal organization as punishment.Comment: 14 pages, 8 figures; accepted for publication in New Journal of Physic

Counterfactual thinking in cooperation dynamics

Counterfactual Thinking is a human cognitive ability studied in a wide variety of domains. It captures the process of reasoning about a past event that did not occur, namely what would have happened had this event occurred, or, otherwise, to reason about an event that did occur but what would ensue had it not. Given the wide cognitive empowerment of counterfactual reasoning in the human individual, the question arises of how the presence of individuals with this capability may improve cooperation in populations of self-regarding individuals. Here we propose a mathematical model, grounded on Evolutionary Game Theory, to examine the population dynamics emerging from the interplay between counterfactual thinking and social learning (i.e., individuals that learn from the actions and success of others) whenever the individuals in the population face a collective dilemma. Our results suggest that counterfactual reasoning fosters coordination in collective action problems occurring in large populations, and has a limited impact on cooperation dilemmas in which coordination is not required. Moreover, we show that a small prevalence of individuals resorting to counterfactual thinking is enough to nudge an entire population towards highly cooperative standards.Comment: 18 page